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SUPERVISING MANAGED SERVICES 
JAMES B. SPETA† 
ABSTRACT 
  Many Internet-access providers simultaneously offer Internet 
access and other services, such as traditional video channels, video on 
demand, voice calling, and other emerging services, through a single, 
converged platform. These other services—which can be called 
“managed services” because the carrier offers them only to its 
subscribers in a manner designed to ensure some quality of service—
in many circumstances will compete with services that are offered by 
unaffiliated parties as applications or services on the Internet. This 
situation creates an important interaction effect between the domains 
of Internet access and managed services, an effect that has largely 
been missing from the decade-long debate over network neutrality 
rules for Internet service. This Article examines this interaction effect, 
focusing on the context of online video services and on the recent 
NBC-Comcast transaction that finally highlighted these concerns. The 
Article contends that, when these interaction effects are understood, a 
nondiscrimination rule applied only to a converged carrier’s Internet 
service can be rendered ineffective by the carrier’s move to managed 
services offerings. As a result, a nondiscrimination rule, if it is to be 
effective, would need to be supplemented by specific behavioral or 
structural rules that both require the carrier to maintain its Internet 
service and limit the carrier’s freedom of action in the managed 
services domain. This reveals the difficulty of drafting effective 
nondiscrimination rules. It also reveals that noneconomic 
justifications for nondiscrimination rules cannot stand alone; they 
must be supplemented by the economic-reasoning tools common to 
antitrust argument, in order to identify and determine the ultimate 
effects of the rules. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Society is finally beginning to see in stark relief the business 
interactions between multiple modes of content distribution on a 
single platform—and the regulatory responses to those business 
interactions. Indeed, this past fall provided a perfect example of these 
challenges of convergence, the phenomenon that general-purpose 
digital platforms can carry any form of content, an example that 
highlights the central difficulty facing the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) view of Internet regulation. In October, in the 
course of particularly contentious, but otherwise typical, carriage 
negotiations between Fox Television and Cablevision, in which the 
broadcaster, as sometimes happens in these negotiations, had 
temporarily pulled its signal off the cable system, Fox also decided to 
deny Cablevision’s Internet subscribers access to Fox’s video content. 
Specifically, for a brief period of time, Fox instructed Hulu1 to block 
Cablevision subscribers’ access to Fox content hosted on Hulu’s site 
and, apparently, did the same on its own Fox.com website.2 Fox’s 
position was understandable: any leverage it had over Cablevision 
came from denying Cablevision’s customers content those customers 
wanted to watch. And, if Cablevision’s cable customers, most of 
whom also had broadband service, could simply watch that same 
content on their Internet service, then Fox’s leverage was severely 
 
 1. Hulu is an online video provider that aggregates television programming from 
numerous different networks and programmers. See infra text accompanying notes 111–13. 
 2. See Ben Drawbaugh, News Corp Pulls Its Hulu Content from Cablevision Customers, 
Escalating Carriage Dispute, ENGADGET.COM (Oct. 16, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.
engadget.com/2010/10/16/news-corp-removes-hulu-from-cablevision-escalating-carriage-dis; 
Brian Stelter & Bill Carter, In Cable TV Fights, Consumers Wait to See Who Blinks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 2010, at A27. 
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diminished. Fox’s action, however, was met with outrage,3 for it 
seemed to many that Fox had violated a norm of the Internet—that 
material made available on the Internet would be made available on 
equal terms to anyone with an Internet connection.4 This is, indeed, a 
strongly but not universally practiced norm. Although many Internet 
services and sites do require payments, there are only a few examples 
of Internet services or content being made available only to some 
people in a way that an individual could not (even if he wished) offer 
the site the going rate for access to the content.5 
This episode reveals the need to consider the manner in which 
content and carriage services interact and to try to disentangle that 
interaction as the market moves forward into the next generation of 
FCC regulation. This episode, in fact, highlights one of the multiple 
dimensions on which Internet services and more traditional media 
services interact—interaction that has not generally been 
acknowledged. While regulators, scholars, and the public have been 
debating the question of nondiscrimination regulation of Internet 
services for more than a decade now,6 the relationship of Internet 
services to more traditional services has played only a small and 
 
 3. See, e.g., Ryan Nakashima, Turning Off Free Web TV, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 26, 
2010, at B1 (“Fox abandoned its Internet blockade after about 12 hours following protests from 
several lawmakers, including Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., a senior member on a House 
subcommittee that oversees technology and the Internet.”); Rob Pegoraro, In Fox-Cablevision 
Dispute, Both Sides Lose—And So Do the Viewers, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at G1 (“Fox, 
meanwhile, burned whatever goodwill it might have had with viewers by briefly preventing 
Cablevision Internet subscribers—even if they paid another company for TV service—from 
watching Fox programs at Hulu or its Fox.com site. This clueless, quickly reversed shoot-the-
hostage move did little beyond making the powerlessness of Hulu’s management obvious—and 
showing a profound lack of imagination by whoever in Fox’s Los Angeles headquarters signed 
off on it.”). 
 4. I am setting aside private individual or corporate use of services that are made 
available via Internet connections, such as remote access to corporate networks. These are not 
Internet services in the sense that I mean: they do not have an arguable public aspect to them, 
and they are not covered by the norm. On the norm, see generally Philip J. Weiser, The Future 
of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 531 (2009), which discusses the early and 
continuing norm of openness on the Internet and the challenge to that norm by commercial 
interests. 
 5. The principal commercial example that I have in mind is ESPN3.com, in which the 
content is made available only to those customers whose Internet service provider (ISP) has 
entered into a subscription relationship with ESPN. See infra notes 122–26 and accompanying 
text. 
 6. For two of the early examples, see generally Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, 
Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2000); and James B. Speta, 
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband 
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000). 
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occasional role in the debate.7 One level of the relationship asks 
whether Internet services themselves are “managed” in the same 
manner as more traditional media services—that is, whether the 
carrier decides on the total mix of services being offered, or whether 
the carrier simply provides bandwidth to the customer and the 
customer then finds on the Internet the content and services that the 
customer wants. This issue—obviously oversimplified—had and has 
consequences for the fundamental characterization question of 
whether Internet services are common-carrier services like traditional 
telephone service or something else. And, of course, whether Internet 
services are considered common-carrier services has consequences for 
the FCC’s current regulatory authority,8 for First Amendment 
analysis,9 and for our intuitions about how Internet services should be 
provisioned and supervised. 
The second level of the relationship between Internet services 
and more traditionally managed services has appeared much less 
frequently in the debate, but this second level will increasingly define 
the challenges for nondiscrimination regulation and, perhaps, for 
communications policy more broadly. From the very beginning, 
cable-modem Internet service has been offered by companies that 
simultaneously offered other services over the very same facilities, 
namely traditional cable service. DSL providers did not 
simultaneously offer other services due to its more limited bandwidth, 
but the telephone companies’ premier broadband services of today 
simultaneously offer Internet, linear video (video offered through 
traditional, programmed channels), and other services. The FCC’s 
recently completed National Broadband Plan report makes clear that 
in the future such platforms will be the center of broadband service.10 
And yet the regulatory machinery has only very recently begun to 
address this interaction. It was only in the FCC’s September 2010 call 
 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See, e.g., James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 124 (2010) (noting that the FCC’s regulatory power over 
Internet sources flows from its authority over common carriers). 
 9. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: 
Determining What “the Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673 (2011) (arguing 
that bare transmission is not speech under First Amendment analysis). 
 10. See generally FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 42 
(2010), available at http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf 
(discussing the emergence of high-speed cable and fiber as the platforms of choice to meet 
emerging consumer demands). 
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for additional comment in its Open Internet proceeding that the FCC 
finally recognized the reality that a carrier’s decisions on Internet 
services are only part of a broader decision on how to use its 
infrastructure more generally.11 That is, a carrier chooses how much 
bandwidth to devote to Internet service and how much to devote to 
video channels, and this choice can affect consumers’ ability to trade 
off between the two types of service. For example, if the “Internet 
channel” is wide enough that a household can watch simultaneous 
high-definition video streams over its Internet service, then there is 
no technological reason for a consumer to also subscribe to the 
simultaneously offered multichannel service. By contrast, if the 
Internet channel does not have enough bandwidth for everyone in the 
household to satisfy his or her video hunger, then the Internet service 
cannot be a complete substitute for the multichannel video service. 
The carrier’s choice is even more important when the carrier is also 
deciding how much bandwidth and quality of service to allocate to 
video-on-demand services. 
This planning decision, at one time, may have had a 
technological dimension, but today it is essentially a business 
decision, and it is this business dimension that creates the most 
difficulty from a regulatory perspective. On traditional video 
channels, the content creator and the carrier-distributor negotiated to 
share the surplus that the service created.12 But with Internet service, 
the distributor has been limited to bandwidth charges—that is, the 
carrier cannot negotiate to share in the surplus of any particularly 
valuable content. And this norm, which network neutrality 
proponents seek to codify in law, influences design decisions in a 
number of ways. For the carriers, it creates some incentive to restrict 
their Internet services so that they can drive customers to the 
platform on which the carriers’ negotiating position is better. It also 
creates the incentive to seek out forms of exclusivity and to duplicate 
traditional business models. 
Although this precise phenomenon—the carrier that 
simultaneously offers a traditional video service or other managed 
services alongside its Internet service—is perhaps new, 
 
 11. Further Inquiry into Two Under-Developed Issues in the Open Internet Proceeding, 75 
Fed. Reg. 55,297 (proposed Sept. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. I). 
 12. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Video Games: The Oddly Familiar Terms of Debate 
About Telco Entry into the Video Services Market, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4 
(2006) (detailing the early practices of the cable television industry). 
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communications law and policy has precedents from which to judge 
an appropriate regulatory paradigm. Congress, through the 
Communications Act,13 and the FCC have considered the value of 
vertical integration against its risks, as well as the value of 
nondiscrimination rules more generally. This Article explores those 
precedents and discusses their possible application to this brave new 
world of broadband service.  
This Article proceeds in three Parts. First, the Article describes 
the place of the managed-services concern in the current debate over 
the regulation of broadband carriers. By “managed services,” which 
the regulators have sometimes called “specialized services,” I mean 
those services that the carriers offer on a subscription basis, whether 
on demand or linearly programmed, but outside of their general-
purpose Internet connection. Current examples are broadband 
carriers’ voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) services and video on 
demand. Until very recently, regulators and commentators have not 
acknowledged that nondiscrimination rules might have feedback into 
the carriers’ incentives over more traditional services or over the 
innovation path for new services. The Comcast-NBC transaction did 
finally bring this concern to the fore, and the conditions imposed on 
the transaction represent one attempt to address it. Second, the 
Article describes the business consequences that attach to the 
carriers’ simultaneous offering of such services, against the backdrop 
of video economics that fundamentally involve windowing and tiering 
in distribution—practices that allow selective exclusivity in the service 
of price discrimination. I describe three emerging online video 
distributors, each of which employs a different kind of exclusivity, to 
highlight the business models affected by nondiscrimination rules. 
Third, the Article contends that this context shows that 
nondiscrimination rules over Internet services can only work if they 
are backed up by reticulated behavioral limits on other services 
offered by integrated carriers. As a result, the only intellectual frame 
through which the issue can profitably be addressed is the frame of 
antitrust analysis. No freestanding nondiscrimination rule will be 
effective. 
 
 13. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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I.  MANAGED SERVICES AND THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE 
In this Part, I discuss how the network neutrality debate, and in 
particular the FCC, has only recently come to articulate and address 
the issue of managed services. More specifically, I discuss how the 
manner in which nondiscrimination requirements on Internet-access 
services may have an incentive effect that encourages carriers to offer 
managed services outside of that regulated domain. By now, the 
terms of the network neutrality debate are well known: whether and 
to what extent government ought to supply rules that require the 
providers of broadband connectivity to carry traffic equally, without 
discrimination as to source, application, or content.14 The precedent 
for network neutrality regulation was the nondiscrimination rule 
applicable to traditional telephone services, a rule embodied in the 
Communications Act15 and derived from the common law of common 
carriage.16 The core of common carriage was the requirement to carry 
all traffic equally, without any difference in service based on the 
identity of the caller or the content of the communications.17 The 
application of the nondiscrimination rule was relatively 
uncontroversial for dial-up Internet service because that service was 
provided over traditional telephone service. 
But the cable companies, not the telephone companies, were the 
vanguards of broadband Internet access in the United States.18 And 
cable companies were not subject to common-carrier rules. Cable had 
been conceived in the broadcast model, in which the distributor—the 
station—chose the content to be provided. Indeed, the FCC’s 
regulatory authority over cable television companies depended 
initially on the view that cable was simply an extension of 
broadcasting. The Communications Act forbade the regulation of 
 
 14. To be sure, the content of the nondiscrimination rule sought is contested, but that 
debate need not be taken up here. 
 15. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
 16. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 53 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 221, 258 (2002) (discussing the common law rule of nondiscrimination, as applied to 
common carriers). 
 17. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998) (describing nondiscrimination as the heart 
of federal common-carrier regulation). 
 18. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 928–29 (2001). 
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broadcasters as common carriers,19 and the Supreme Court extended 
this restriction to cable regulation.20 Despite the later statutory 
addition of certain quasi-common-carriage obligations—such as must 
carry and the obligation to provide public access, educational, and 
governmental channels—the statute also replicated the prohibition on 
common-carrier regulation of cable services.21 As the Supreme Court 
put it in Turner Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC,22 “Through ‘original 
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations 
or programs to include in its repertoire,’ cable programmers and 
operators ‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of 
topics and in a wide variety of formats.’”23 That is, like broadcasters, 
cable companies choose their own content, or, more precisely, they 
choose the content that they offer to their customers. 
As a legal matter, of course, this decision did not wholly resolve 
the issue, for cable companies’ Internet services might or might not be 
“cable services,” and the Act’s prohibition on common carrier 
regulation extends only to cable services. If they were 
telecommunications services, then common carrier rules would be 
appropriate. In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland,24 AT&T argued that 
its offering of a cable Internet service provider (ISP) was essentially 
the same as its choosing a channel.25 Before the FCC took the 
definitive position that cable-modem services were information 
services under the Act, courts had rejected the notion that they were 
cable services, principally because they did not meet the model of 
operator selection of content.26 
That cable companies offered broadband services together with 
their traditional video programming naturally had an effect on their 
 
 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (“[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as 
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”). 
 20. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979) 
(interpreting the Communications Act of 1934 to be inapplicable to cable companies). 
 21. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (“Any cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a common 
carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service.”). 
 22. Turner Broad. Corp. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 23. Id. at 636 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 
(1986)). 
 24. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 25. Id. at 876. 
 26. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979 
(2005) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the FCC’s interpretation of the 
Communications Act that cable internet services did not qualify as a telecommunications 
service). 
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incentives, although the FCC did not immediately acknowledge this 
effect. The effect was partly economic and partly technical. As early 
as 2001, advocates of cable open-access rules argued that cable 
broadband providers would not permit broadband video services to 
be deployed, because those services would compete against the cable 
companies’ own video services: “Broadband is a potential competitor 
to traditional cable video services. Traditional cable providers might 
well view this competition as a long term threat to their business 
model . . . .”27 What was largely unacknowledged in these arguments 
was the (at least partial) artificiality of the incentive problem: In 
traditional cable services, cable companies earned revenues both 
from subscriber fees and from fees charged to content providers for 
distribution.28 With Internet services, the bandwidth providers were 
supposed to earn revenues only from subscriber revenues. If, 
however, the cable companies were free to impose similar “access 
charges . . . on ISPs and content providers” then they would be 
indifferent—and would “maximize their profits” by allowing 
customers to view whatever customers wanted to view the most, 
“[e]ven if cable internet users [began] to watch internet video instead 
of traditional cable programs.”29 Thus, the first interaction effect was 
this: if Internet service did not allow cable operators to develop 
business models that had traditionally been important to their overall 
revenues and if those cable companies had a degree of market power, 
they could indeed have the incentive to restrict the development of 
Internet video, in one way or another. 
Professors Thomas Hazlett and George Bittlingmayer extended 
the interaction argument along a different vector, noting that cable 
company actions that enhanced Internet video made DSL services 
more desirable, making DSL more of a substitute not just for cable-
 
 27. Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig at 22, 
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations 
from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp. Transferee, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816 (2000), 
suspended, 16 FCC Rcd. 5835 (2001) (CS Docket No. 99-251), available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/works/lessig/lem-lesd.pdf. 
 28. This oversimplifies matters. In some cases, the cable companies have to pay the content 
providers when the content is extremely popular. In most cases, the parties share the revenues 
generated through advertising, either explicitly or implicitly by dividing the rights to program 
commercials. See infra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 29. James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 
975, 1005 (2000). 
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modem service but also for cable television.30 As a result, cable 
companies had an incentive to limit the bandwidth that they devoted 
to Internet service: “A more vigorous transition by cable operators 
could lead to the development of web-based services including video-
streaming and other substitutes for networks now packaged by cable 
system operators, exposing cable assets to intensified demands for 
common carrier regulation.”31 Relatedly, cable companies had the 
incentive to keep narrow their Internet-access bandwidth, to stunt the 
growth of online video, and to protect their own video services. This 
strategy, however, would not violate network neutrality rules because 
it would starve the Internet pipe rather than discriminating among 
sources available over the Internet. 
When the FCC acted in the open-access debate and rejected calls 
to unbundle cable-modem services or to subject those services to 
common-carrier rules, the FCC did not address these incentive 
arguments at all. For example, in the AT&T-TCI merger, when the 
FCC first addressed the issue of open access, the Commission focused 
principally on access requests by unaffiliated ISPs and “conclude[d] 
that nothing about the proposed merger would deny any customer 
(including AT&T-TCI customers) the ability to access the Internet 
content or portal of his or her choice.”32 Although the parties also 
sought conditions opening the cable services of the combined 
company and enhancing the program-access rules, each of these 
issues was presented on a stand-alone basis.33 As the AT&T cable 
operation grew through its merger with MediaOne, some parties 
became concerned that AT&T could negotiate exclusive 
arrangements to content that would disadvantage other cable or 
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) companies.34 But the FCC 
responded by simply noting its existing rules: “If parties believe any 
existing exclusivity agreements violate the program access rules, the 
 
 30. Thomas W. Hazlett & George Bittlingmayer, The Political Economy of Cable “Open 
Access,” 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 34. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, To AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14 
FCC Rcd. 3160, 3207 (1999) (memorandum opinion and order). 
 33. See id. at 3176–77 (rejecting requests for access to TCI facilities to provide competing 
multichannel video services); id. at 3179–80 (affirming that FCC program-access rules would 
apply to the merged entity but refusing to go beyond those rules). 
 34. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, To AT&T Corp. Transferee, 15 FCC 
Rcd. 9816, 9854 (2000) (memorandum opinion and order). 
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program access complaint process is the appropriate forum in which 
to resolve any such grievance.”35 This fight was conducted solely on 
the traditional, cable-television side of the house. As to Internet 
services, the FCC refused to apply open-access conditions for two 
reasons: First, it found “that there is significant actual and potential 
competition from both alternative broadband providers and from 
unaffiliated ISPs that may gain access to the merged firm’s cable 
systems.”36 Second, AT&T committed to allow “[d]irect access to all 
content available on the World Wide Web without any AT&T-
imposed charge to the consumer for such content.”37 In part, this 
reflects a different state of the market, one in which the business 
models of concern today—the integration of cable and broadband 
and the provision of high-quality video content solely over the 
Internet channel—had not yet developed. 
As the late 1990s became the early and mid-2000s, this debate 
over open access—renamed network neutrality38—continued in both 
the academy39 and the agency, with the FCC eventually issuing a 
Policy Statement40 in which it adopted, at a high level, a commitment 
to nondiscrimination. The FCC said that “consumers are entitled to 
access the lawful Internet content of their choice” and that 
“consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers, and content providers.”41 The 
FCC’s statement was directed against Internet-carrier policies that 
might have the effect of blocking or degrading content and not 
against any similar practices in the traditional or managed services 
realm.42 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 9866. 
 37. Id. at 9869–70. 
 38. See generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
 39. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Addison C. Harris Lecture, Intellectual Properties: Old 
Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 818–19 (2001) (positing that open access is 
suboptimal because the customary theories of private property and the commons in physical 
space are capable of precise carryover to the Internet), with Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and 
Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 111 (2001) 
(contending that frequency spectrum should be devoted to an open-access commons, rather 
than commoditizing and auctioning it). 
 40. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 
20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) (policy statement). 
 41. Id. at 14,988. 
 42. See id. at 14,987 (directing the policy statement at “[i]nformation service providers”). 
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The FCC’s Internet Policy Statement focused on the Internet 
carriers’ ability to block traffic but did not itself state a theory of the 
reasons that might motivate carriers to do so. That would finally 
come, albeit incompletely, in the Comcast matter.43 In that case, the 
FCC addressed complaints that Comcast had been secretly blocking 
certain BitTorrent traffic on its Internet service. The FCC found that 
“[w]hen Comcast judges that there are too many peer-to-peer 
uploads in a given area, Comcast’s equipment terminates some of 
those connections by sending RST [reset-the-connection] packets.”44 
The FCC’s reasoning finally cracked through the separate treatment 
of traditional services and broadband service. Oddly, however, this 
discussion came in the section of the decision in which the FCC was 
defending its jurisdiction and not in the section of the opinion in 
which it found Comcast’s practices unreasonable. Nevertheless, the 
FCC now clearly had in mind that a cable company’s video services 
could have an effect on its Internet platform actions. It said, 
[I]f cable companies such as Comcast are barred from inhibiting 
consumer access to high-definition on-line video content, then, as 
discussed above, consumers with cable modem service will have 
available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could 
rapidly become an alternative to cable television. The competition 
provided by this alternative should result in downward pressure on 
cable television prices, which have increased rapidly in recent 
years.45 
This reasoning was problematic for a number of reasons, most 
particularly because the FCC did not find that Comcast had market 
power.46 It did, however, reveal a more dynamic way of thinking 
about the network neutrality problem, and it drew on the incentive 
 
 43. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation 
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008) (memorandum 
opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
 44. Id. at 13,051. 
 45. Id. at 13,037. 
 46. For example, the complaint’s reasoning holds principally if Comcast exercises market 
power, but the FCC did not find that Comcast has market power in any relevant market. See 
James B. Speta, A Sensible Next Step on Network Neutrality: The Market Power Question, 8 
REV. NETWORK ECON. 113, 121–23 (2009) (discussing the centrality of the market-power 
question to this analysis). 
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arguments being made in the literature, at least those by network 
neutrality advocates.47 
Finally, at the same time its Comcast decision was on appeal, the 
FCC began a rulemaking proceeding—the Open Internet 
proceeding—to definitively address network neutrality.48 Here, the 
FCC belatedly acknowledged the strong interaction between network 
neutrality rules and the carriers’ incentives to maintain or deploy 
managed services, doing so in strong terms despite ultimately taking 
no action on these stated concerns. The initial notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) raised the concern only in a general manner, 
stating that “there are and will continue to be Internet Protocol–
based offerings (including voice and subscription video services, and 
certain business services provided to enterprise customers), often 
provided over the same networks.”49 Calling these “‘managed’ or 
‘specialized’ services,” the Commission said that it was “sensitive to 
any risk that the growth of managed or specialized services might 
supplant or otherwise negatively affect the open Internet.”50 Its 
request for comments, however, was very broad and general, 
revealing no particular action that the FCC thought it might pursue. 
To cure this gap, in September 2010, the FCC issued a supplementary 
request for comments to fill in an inadequate record.51 The agency 
then acknowledged that, through the unrestricted possibility of 
managed services, “[o]pen Internet protections may be weakened if 
broadband providers offer specialized services that are substantially 
similar to, but do not technically meet the definition of, broadband 
Internet access service, and if consumer protections do not apply to 
such services.”52 Reflecting the concern of Hazlett and 
Bittlingmayer,53 the agency also said that providers might “constrict or 
fail to continue expanding the network capacity allocated to 
 
 47. See Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig, 
supra note 27, at 36 (“[A]llowing the cable companies to . . . [monopolize] a competitive market 
offers no guarantee of giving the appropriate incentive . . . .”). 
 48. See Preserving the Open Internet, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,638, 62,638 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) 
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8) (“In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the 
Commission considers adopting rules to preserve the open Internet.”). 
 49. Id. at 62,651. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Further Inquiry into Two Under-Developed Issues in the Open Internet Proceeding, 75 
Fed. Reg. 55,297 (proposed Sept. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. I). 
 52. Id. at 55,299. 
 53. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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broadband Internet access service.”54 Finally, the FCC expressed its 
concern over anticompetitive conduct, “particularly if [providers] are 
vertically integrated providers of content, applications, or services.”55 
The Further Notice suggested several possible responses to these 
concerns, including both regulatory and structural responses.56 
Despite these specifically noted concerns and despite the additional 
call for comments, the final Open Internet Order did not impose any 
restrictions on specialized services.57 
The last stage in this largely descriptive story is the recent 
regulatory approval of the Comcast-NBC joint venture, in which both 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FCC subjected the 
transaction to conditions designed specifically to address the 
interaction between network neutrality regulation and the company’s 
managed services. Although some vertical integration is present 
between other distribution and content companies, the merger 
presented such integration on a larger scale. Comcast is the biggest 
cable company in the United States, and NBC is one of the leading 
broadcast networks with one of the most extensive libraries of movies 
(Universal Studios) and other programming.58 Under the transaction, 
Comcast would acquire control of all of NBC Universal’s content 
through a joint venture, while also contributing content of its own to 
that venture. Although Comcast would initially share ownership of 
the joint venture, it would both control it and have an option to 
acquire the remaining equity from General Electric, NBC Universal’s 
current owner.59 
The principal competition arguments present in the NBC-
Comcast merger were straightforward vertical-foreclosure stories, in 
which Comcast might use its newfound control over desirable content 
to disadvantage competitors, and both the FCC and the DOJ imposed 
conditions on the merger designed to meet those threats. In the first 
version of the anticompetition story, Comcast would deny other 
 
 54. Further Inquiry into Two Under-Developed Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. at 55,299. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 35–36 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order). 
 58. See Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc. for 
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 249, 
253–54 (2011) (memorandum opinion and order) (describing the sizes, business interests, and 
holdings of the three companies). 
 59. Id. at 254–55. 
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multichannel video-program distributors (MVPDs) access to 
desirable content, or alternatively charge very high prices, putting 
them at a disadvantage for subscribers. Comcast has denied access to 
its regional sports network in Philadelphia, for example, to competing 
satellite and cable providers, and the merger, it was argued, would 
create a greater incentive for it to do so more generally.60 Critics of 
the deal also suggested that Comcast would have the same incentive 
to deny content to online video providers, which would compete with 
Comcast’s traditional services and which would be available over any 
broadband medium.61 
To respond to these concerns, the DOJ Antitrust Division and 
the FCC each imposed conditions on the merger. Comcast will be 
required to provide any content in the joint venture to any MVPD if 
that content is provided to any other MVPD, including Comcast 
itself. Additionally, the FCC imposed a baseball-arbitration regime to 
resolve any disputes over licensing fees.62 This regime, based upon 
similar remedies applied in previous mergers, takes account of the 
combination of content and distribution assets. As to online video, 
the conditions were more elaborate, and they were based on a strong 
 
 60. See id. at 260 (stating that conditions imposed on the transaction are “consistent with 
our previous finding that Comcast’s withholding of the terrestrially delivered Comcast 
SportsNet Philadelphia RSN from DBS operators caused the percentage of television 
households subscribing to DBS in Philadelphia to be 40 percent lower than what it otherwise 
would have been”). 
 61. See, e.g., Mark Cooper, Structured Viral Communications: The Political Economy and 
Social Organization of Digital Disintermediation, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 46, 
46 n.107 (2011) (detailing this argument and providing an account of online video providers’ 
anxieties regarding the Comcast-NBC merger); see also Comments of Netflix, Inc. at 6, 
Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (GN Docket No. 09-191, WC 
Docket No. 07-52), available at https://prodnet.www.neca.org/publicationsdocs/wwpdf/
0114netflix.pdf (arguing that the Comcast-NBC merger will exacerbate the potential problem of 
video providers using their gatekeeper control over programming networks and broadband 
access to stifle competition and discriminate against outside content); Yinka Adegoke, Web TV 
Could Come with a Price Tag After Comcast-NBC, REUTERS, Oct. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5942UI20091005 (expressing concern over the 
anticompetitive effects that would flow from Comcast’s having a vested interest in Hulu’s 
future). 
 62. Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc., 52 
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 270. Baseball arbitration is shorthand for final-offer arbitration, in 
which the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the parties’ final proposals instead of being 
free to fashion the solution that the arbitrator may perceive to be best. Baseball arbitration may 
shift some bargaining power to weaker parties. See generally James R. Chelius & James B. 
Dworkin, An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device, 24 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 293, 296 (1980). 
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finding that online video presented an important source of potential 
competition to cable: 
  When measured by the number of customers who are cord-
shaving or cord-cutting [i.e., downgrading or eliminating their 
traditional cable service], OVDs [online video distributors] currently 
have a de minimis share of the video programming distribution 
market. Their current market share, however, greatly understates 
their potential competitive significance in this market. Whether 
viewers buy individual or a combination of OVD services, OVDs 
are likely to continue to develop into better substitutes for MVPD 
video services.63 
The conditions were designed to protect these nascent competitors. 
First, Comcast is required to provide video to any online provider on 
the same terms that it provides the video to an MVPD.64 This 
condition, although placing OVDs on the same footing as MVPDs, is 
unlikely to appeal to the core OVD business model because it 
essentially requires the OVD to offer the content in the same linear-
programming format as do cable and satellite companies. As the DOJ 
acknowledges, online video generally does not follow a linear format: 
“One reason for the dramatic growth of online distribution is the 
increased consumer interest in on-demand viewing, especially among 
younger viewers who have grown up with the Internet, and are 
accustomed to viewing video at a time and on a device of their 
choosing.”65 
The second condition has more teeth: the joint venture will be 
required to license to any OVD “broadcast, cable, or film content 
comparable in scope and quality to the content the OVD receives 
from one of the [joint venture]’s programming peers.”66 This 
benchmarked solution is designed to ensure that the joint venture 
behaves in the same manner that a programmer without an interest in 
distribution would behave. Additionally, Comcast is required to hold 
only equity—not voting or operational control—in Hulu and must 
continue to provide Hulu the same type of programming that NBC 
Universal currently does.67 
 
 63. Competitive Impact Statement at 18, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-
00106 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf. 
 64. Id. at 31–32. 
 65. Id. at 15. 
 66. Id. at 31. 
 67. Id. at 26, 33–34. 
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The most open-ended of the content restrictions has to do with 
exclusive licensing practices. The DOJ acknowledged that exclusive 
licensing arrangements can sometimes be procompetitive.68 Content 
providers often use exclusive distribution arrangements in order to 
segment the market—to price-discriminate—which many hold is 
important to assure adequate returns in content industries and which, 
in any event, is a customary practice.69 With the merger, the DOJ was 
concerned about both the joint venture’s use of its content through 
exclusive licensing and Comcast’s use of its power in the cable 
distribution market to require content-providers to offer exclusive 
deals, either of which could injure Comcast’s distribution competitors. 
Thus, the Consent Decree limits both the joint venture and Comcast 
to “reasonable and customary exclusivity provisions,” benchmarked 
against the exclusivity practices of the most comparable distribution 
and content providers.70 
The Consent Decree also imposed conditions on Comcast’s 
offering of “specialized services,” which fall within the umbrella of 
managed services.71 The Decree defined specialized service as every 
service offered by Comcast, except to the extent those services are 
regulated as telecommunications or cable services or are themselves 
Internet Access Services. As to Internet Access Services, the Decree 
imposes a network neutrality provision.72 The agencies forbade 
Comcast from developing a specialized service consisting of only 
joint-venture content, to prevent the circumvention of the other 
content requirements and of the network neutrality rule.73 Similarly, 
 
 68. Id. at 34–35. 
 69. See id. (“The video programming distribution industry frequently uses exclusive 
contract terms that can be procompetitive.”). 
 70. Id. at 36. 
 71. See [Proposed] Final Judgment at 7, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106 
(D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266160.pdf (defining 
a specialized service as “any service provided over the same last-mile facilities used to deliver 
Internet Access Service other than (1) Internet Access Services, (2) services regulated either as 
telecommunications services under Title II of the Communications Act or as MVPD services 
under Title VI of the Communications Act, or (3) Defendants’ existing VoIP telephony 
service”). 
 72. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63, at 38 (“Section V.G.1 of the 
proposed Final Judgment prohibits Comcast from unreasonably discriminating in the 
transmission of lawful traffic over its Internet access service, with the proviso that reasonable 
network management practices do not constitute unreasonable discrimination.”). 
 73. Id. at 38–39 (“If Comcast were to offer online video services through Specialized 
Services, however, it could effectively avoid the prohibitions [on network neutrality and content 
distribution].”). 
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they required Comcast to provide other OVDs access to specialized 
services if Comcast offered an OVD service as a specialized service.74 
Finally, in order to ensure that Comcast could not limit 
bandwidth across the board, thus restricting competition while still 
complying with the network neutrality provision, the agencies 
required Comcast to “maintain its public Internet access service at a 
level that typically would allow any user on the network to download 
content from the public Internet at speeds of at least 12 megabits per 
second in markets where it has deployed DOCSIS 3.0.”75 The 
Department of Justice said, “These speeds are sufficient to ensure 
that Comcast’s Internet access services can support the development 
of OVDs as well as other services that are potentially competitive 
with Comcast’s own offerings.”76 
II.  THE EDGE OF ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS 
The NBC-Comcast merger therefore brought to the forefront 
competition issues that had long been ignored in the network 
neutrality debate specifically and in the broader discussion of how 
traditional regulation should transition to a new generation of 
Internet regulation. The merger did this both because of the scale and 
scope of the merger and because it implicated emerging online 
business models that parties thought the merged company might 
replicate. These business models demonstrate the content of the 
competition problems but also, I suggest, demonstrate the 
fundamental problems of service-specific approaches to competition 
problems in information policy. In this Part, after a brief detour into 
some basics of media economics, I take up three case studies of online 
video distribution: Hulu, the broadcasters’ joint venture; ESPN3.com, 
the online sports-video service owned by Disney’s ESPN, the 800-
pound gorilla of video; and the cable companies’ own TV Everywhere 
product. These case studies help frame the regulatory response to 
date, but they are not the end of the story. This section concludes 
with some speculation concerning the next frame of Internet services, 
services that might be offered as “specialized services” and thereby 
re-envision all of the debates to date. 
 
 74. Id. at 39. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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A. Some Basic Video Economics 
Video creation and distribution is one of the biggest industries in 
the United States, and it has been for more than half a century; it is 
also one of the few industries in which the United States continues to 
have a positive trade balance.77 Yet the economics of it are tricky, and 
at both the production and distribution levels, the economics have 
resulted in a fair degree of government intervention. Copyright, of 
course, governs production, and the government has regulated 
broadcasting through spectrum licensing and cable through 
franchising, rate regulation, and a variety of other techniques. For 
present purposes, the economics of the regulation are less important 
than the industry strategies that have grown up around video, in 
response to both the difficult economics of video and to the 
regulation itself. 
Here, I briefly describe what should be familiar to any video 
consumer—and Americans are almost uniformly huge consumers of 
video.78 Video producers and distributors each rely on various 
practices to segment audiences and engage in effective price-
discrimination in order to increase total revenues. Video producers 
rely on “windowing”—the practice of releasing a video through 
different distribution channels at different times, with various periods 
of exclusivity. Distributors similarly rely on windowing, tiering, 
bundling, and other practices to maximize revenues. Producers and 
distributors negotiate to share in the revenues created by these 
business practices; they are cooperative in that the provision of the 
video experience to the ultimate consumer requires producers and 
 
 77. See Martha Bayles, The Return of Cultural Diplomacy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2008, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/31/the-return-of-cultural-diplomacy.html (“The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis reports that between 1986 and 2005, foreign sales of U.S. motion-picture 
and video products rose from $1.91 billion to $10.4 billion (in 2005 dollars)—an increase of 444 
percent. As Dan Glickman, president of the Motion Picture Association says, ‘Among all the 
sectors of the U.S. economy, our industry is the only one that generates a positive balance of 
trade in every country in which it does business.’ The same is true for the TV and music 
industries, and the reach is far greater when piracy is figured in.”). 
 78. See Megan O’Neill, The Average American Watches 30 Minutes of Online Video vs 5 
Hours of TV per Day, SOCIAL TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www.socialtimes.com/
2010/11/online-video-consumption (“While 30 minutes of online video a day may pale in 
comparison to the 5 hours of television that the average American watches on a daily basis . . . it 
still shows the rapid rate at which online video is growing.”); TV, Internet and Mobile Usage in 
U.S. Continues to Rise, NIELSEN WIRE (Feb. 23, 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/
online_mobile/tv-internet-and-mobile-usage-in-us-continues-to-rise (“[T]he average American 
watches 151 hours of TV per month . . . .”). 
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distributors to act jointly, but they are adversarial in that they are 
negotiating over their respective shares of the surplus produced.79 
Internet video, especially Internet piracy, has put substantial pressure 
on windowing practices, shortening windows and changing the 
importance of different types of distribution channels. The parties’ 
negotiations are also affected by the transition from traditional modes 
of production and channels of distribution to the era of Internet 
video. 
Producers of television programs and movies “discriminate 
among audiences by releasing their products at different times 
(windows) and in different distribution channels.”80 In windowing, the 
producer balances a variety of factors in trying to maximize 
profitability, although the essential issue is “forc[ing] buyers to sort 
themselves out according to how much they are willing to pay for the 
film or program close to its original release date.”81 In 1989, a movie 
might have had a six-year period over which it was released to as 
many as nine different distribution channels, including domestic 
theaters (first and second run), overseas theaters, home video 
(domestic then overseas), first cable run (usually premium), broadcast 
networks (domestic then overseas), second cable run, and then 
syndication to local television.82 The availability of windowing to 
increase profitability has a feedback effect on the production market: 
“The tendency of windowing to increase production budgets favors 
the producers of programs that are suitable for windowing. Producers 
of programs for which there is likely to be a continuing demand can, 
and do, spend more to produce their programs.”83 
 
 79. See CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34078, RETRANSMISSION 
CONSENT AND OTHER FEDERAL RULES AFFECTING PROGRAMMER-DISTRIBUTOR 
NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2007) (“Despite all these complexities, the 
relationships among content producer, programmer, and distributor are characterized by mutual 
need—both the content producer and the programmer need distributors that have direct contact 
with the potential audience; the distributor needs content producers and programmers with 
good content to attract subscribers. At the same time, there is an inherent tension as each seeks 
to capture the lion’s share of the value that consumers place on the content.”). 
 80. BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 29 (1992). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 30 tbl.2.2 (citing A Survey of the Entertainment Industry, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL 
REP.), Dec. 23, 1989, at 5). 
 83. Id. at 49. 
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The modern era has seen a shift in windowing practices,84 
although the practice has remained fundamental in most video 
markets. The channels of distribution have shifted, with several new 
channels becoming important, frequently to the detriment of other 
channels. Home video distribution—videotape and then DVD—
became increasingly important,85 but then it began to wane as online 
distribution became more important. Accelerated release dates for 
home video reduced the length of first-run theater releases and 
decreased revenues for releases that occurred after the DVD releases. 
Video-on-demand products from traditional cable companies provide 
a channel quite similar to release on tape or DVD. Online 
distribution of television shows is now quite common, and online 
distribution both changes the primacy of broadcasters in the 
distribution chain and changes the market for DVD collections 
released after the season concludes. Online distribution has not 
eliminated the DVD channel because of the instability of online 
models and the lower quality of video. But revenues in the DVD 
segment are definitely down.86 
Some of the shift in distribution windows has been driven, of 
course, by the rise of a distribution channel that is not part of the 
producers’ business model—online piracy.87 It is hard to “compete 
with free,” and studios and others attribute accelerated distribution 
schedules that greatly reduce the periods of exclusivity, especially to 
theaters, to the need to provide an alternative to viewing illegally 
copied movies on the Internet.88 Such pirated copies are widely 
 
 84. Jason Kilar, Here Are My Thoughts on Hulu and the Future of TV, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 
3, 2011, 6:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/jason-kilar-here-are-my-thoughts-on-hulu-
and-the-future-of-tv-2011-2 (positing that recent innovations in windowing will continue). 
 85. Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 125, 128–29 (2011) (detailing the evolution of the home video platform from an 
industry-perceived nuisance to a multibillion-dollar, industry-sustaining revenue stream). 
 86. See, e.g., Tim Arango, Viacom Profit and Revenue Decline as DVD Sales Drop, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, at B4 (noting the significant decline in DVD revenues); Brooks Barnes, 
Who Threw the DVD from the Train?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU4 (same). 
 87. See David A. Cook & Wenli Wang, Neutralizing the Piracy of Motion Pictures: 
Reengineering the Industry’s Supply Chain, 26 TECH. SOC’Y 567, 568 (2004) (detailing how 
millions of dollars of losses resulting from online piracy have motivated content industries to 
address their online distribution capabilities). 
 88. See, e.g., Shujen Wang, Recontextualizing Copyright: Piracy, Hollywood, the State, and 
Globalization, 43 CINEMA J. 25, 30 (2003) (“Speed becomes a major goal of, and a challenge to, 
participants in the global informational structure. Speed is also one of the factors determining 
the success and prevalence of the piracy networks. Viewed in this context, the windowing 
strategies practiced by Hollywood help manage time and control speed through space so as to 
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available very soon after—and sometimes before—theatrical 
release.89 The early release to video is meant to capture the audience 
that does not go to the theater but, given the easily accessible online 
copies, will not wait a long time for a cheaper release window.90 
Although it has not eliminated piracy online, earlier release to DVD 
and now earlier release to online streaming services create an 
alternative revenue stream—just as iTunes and similar services did 
for music sales. 
The Comcast-NBC merger, it was thought, also created 
opportunities for further changes to windowing practices. It was 
obvious that Comcast would “use Universal’s vast film library to 
expand its own video-on-demand opportunities.”91 But commentators 
on the merger also speculated that Comcast might “break what has 
been a taboo in the movie business: allowing consumers to watch a 
film at home while it is still being shown in theaters.”92 As in many 
cases of channel evolution, the prospects for such a change would not 
only depend on the profits to the producers of the video, but would 
also be subject to a negotiation with other stakeholders in other 
channels which, although perhaps less important, would not be 
irrelevant. For example, enhancing video on demand “may 
cannibalize DVD sales or offend important retailers like Wal-Mart[, 
the nation’s biggest seller of DVDs; m]ultiplex owners might also be 
skittish.”93 Renegotiating rights windows that have already been 
granted and, more generally, simply assuaging long-standing partners 
 
minimize the threat posed by new technologies. Despite these efforts, however, technologically 
savvy pirates and their ever-more-efficient and flexible networks have seriously undermined the 
studios’ control.”); see also Cook & Wang, supra note 87, at 569 (“[W]e believe that a more 
effective approach to neutralizing piracy of motion pictures is to reengineer the industry’s 
supply chain in such a way that it can offer legal, cheaper, more convenient, and more enjoyable 
entertainment than anything illicit copies can provide.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Anna E. Engelman & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet 
Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 59 (2004) (“Today, a movie can be downloaded in hours, for 
free, and burned onto DVD before it is in theaters.”). 
 90. As evidence of iTunes’s increasing value to music content industries, consider its 2008 
press release indicating that it had surpassed Wal-Mart as the leading music retailer in the 
United States. Press Release, Apple, iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 2, 2008), 
available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03itunes.html. 
 91. Lauren A.E. Schuker, Comcast May Test New ‘Windows’ for Movies on Cable, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 3, 2009, at B9. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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has been one of the hurdles to overcome in the development of new 
online video distribution models.94 
Program distributors such as cable television companies also 
engage in well-known practices to segment audiences. Premium tiers 
and premium channels attract customers with high willingness to pay 
for niche programming—and the offerings are nearly unlimited, 
ranging from premium movie channels, to out-of-market sports 
channels, to overseas news and entertainment channels. Video-on-
demand products attract consumers with higher willingness to pay for 
particular programming—willingness to pay that can come from the 
desire to see a show either sooner or later, as video-on-demand 
movies are sometimes released earlier than through other channels 
while video-on-demand television viewing allows a viewer to miss the 
show’s regular broadcast.95 As channel capacity and addressability 
have both improved, cable companies can merge premium offerings 
into combinations of linear programming and video on demand. 
The obvious use of tiering for premium offerings, including not 
just packages of premium channels but also the offering of individual 
channels, has in part raised the question of why cable companies and 
other MVPDs do not sell all of their channels on an à la carte basis. 
The push for à la carte cable services has multiple rationales, 
including audience members who seek such a requirement in order to 
limit their exposure to what they view as harmful content.96 But as an 
economic matter, the argument is that consumers are being forced to 
pay for programming that they do not want when the lowest tier 
available, other than a broadcast-only tier, comes with dozens of 
channels, most of which any given consumer does not watch. As 
former FCC Chairman Kevin Martin contended, 
Channel choice is increasingly significant to consumers as the 
number of channels included in expanded basic, and the 
corresponding price to consumers, has continued to skyrocket . . . . 
Indeed, cable rates have more than doubled in the last ten years. 
Cable companies often point to the increased number of channels 
being offered as an explanation for the increase in prices. This 
 
 94. See generally Adam Webb, Viewing Rights, NEW MEDIA AGE, Mar. 8, 2007, at 23 
(discussing the issues surrounding traditional media companies distributing video online). 
 95. Producers and distributors are still trying to figure out how (and if) consumers will pay 
for the value of time-shifting. See infra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
 96. E.g., John Rash, Editorial, Rash Report: MTV’s ‘Skins’ Bares Public-Policy Divisions, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 5, 2011, at 9A (holding out à la carte cable as a way parents 
could easily control what shows their children watch). 
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explanation, however, ignores the fact that most of these channels 
are not actually being watched.97 
Some economics research has suggested modest savings to consumers 
would result from offering channels à la carte,98 but those would 
certainly not be pro rata savings. 
The best explanation for bundling at the basic tier is the same 
low-marginal-cost problem faced generally in content industries. 
Here, the cable companies have a very low marginal cost for 
providing consumers with additional channels, and a relatively higher 
cost of developing the infrastructure necessary to separate channels 
and separately bill for them. Customers purchase the package that 
includes the individual channels they want to view, at a price they are 
willing to pay,99 and, in general, they are indifferent to whether the 
package also comes with channels they do not want.100 Bundling is a 
common practice in many industries in which the consumer is in the 
best position to select from a menu of related goods.101 In the cable 
 
 97. FCC’s Martin Supports ‘A La Carte’ Cable Plans, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 22, 2007, 4:51 
PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2174261,00.asp (quoting Martin). 
 98. See, e.g., CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33338, THE FCC’S “A 
LA CARTE” REPORTS 2 (2006) (noting that one of two FCC reports on à la carte pricing 
concluded that “a la carte purchasing is likely to lower the monthly bill” of cable subscribers 
who already receive digital cable); Gregory S. Crawford & Joseph Cullen, Bundling, Product 
Choice, and Efficiency: Should Cable Television Networks Be Offered à la Carte?, 19 INFO. 
ECON. & POL’Y 379, 402 (2007) (“[I]n a ‘Full À La Carte’ world, if all networks continue to be 
offered, average per-household consumers surplus is estimated to increase [by 65.6%].”). 
 99. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Shedding Tiers for a la Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable 
TV Pricing, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 253, 257 (2006) (“A household subscribes to 
basic cable if and only if the value they place on the programming they desire to watch exceeds 
the retail price. That is true even though no customer watches every channel, but only their own 
customized sub-set of programs. Effectively, the consumer subscribes to realize their individual 
preferences, and the cable company tosses in the additional channels for free.”). 
 100. Those viewers who have objections to the content of the channels they do not want to 
view (and may fear members of their household inadvertently viewing) may have a negative 
value for the presence of those channels in their bundle. The policy question is whether those 
objections are best met through the regulation of cable systems to require à la carte sales or to 
enable—or mandate—premises-driven blocking technologies. The major cable companies 
provide premises-based technology and also allow customers to request the blocking of 
channels. See id. at 284–85 (“Individual subscribers can remove unwanted programming from 
appearing on their home television screens. . . . On a targeted basis, individual households are 
able to remove programming, gaining utility and incurring only modest costs. . . . Channel 
blocking is relatively simple when using a television set with a digital set-top box. . . . Advanced 
analog set-top boxes also have channel blocking capabilities . . . .”). 
 101. See, e.g., Joseph P. Guiltinan, The Price of Bundling of Services: A Normative 
Framework, 51 J. MARKETING 74, 74 (1987) (“Broadly defined, bundling is the practice of 
marketing two or more products and/or services in a single ‘package’ for a special price. 
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context, some people also assert that it reduces the overall costs of 
production and distribution because programmers are not required to 
engage in the advertising necessary to gain initial subscribers.102 
All of a distributor’s practices are finalized in a negotiation with 
the program owner, a negotiation that divides pricing issues and 
distribution over a number of dimensions. Distribution companies 
sometimes pay program owners directly, sending a portion of monthly 
subscriber revenues directly to the program owner, when the program 
content is particularly important. The program owner and the 
distributor can also share the right to place advertising on the 
programming and thereby share in the advertising revenue generated 
by the programming. This practice allows dollars to flow in the other 
direction, from programmer to distributor.103 The parties also 
negotiate over the distribution practices. In one of the more famous 
examples, Disney used its control over ABC and ESPN 
programming—two very valuable properties that cable companies 
cannot really do without—to negotiate to move the Disney Channel 
to the expanded-basic tier, which then created the outlet for the 
tween-programming boom.104 One can dispute the social utility of 
Lizzie McGuire105 and Hannah Montana,106 but the negotiation 
demonstrates the powerful position that channel placement has in 
 
Certainly this practice is not new to the field of marketing. For years, firms in a number of 
industries have used such tactics as the block-booking of a set of movies and the sale of 
maintenance contracts with computer hardware.”). For other examples of bundling, see id. 
 102. See Hazlett, supra note 99, at 282. 
 103. See GOLDFARB, supra note 79, at 18–19 (discussing the multiple dimensions of 
negotiations between networks and cable distributors); Harry Berkowitz, For Cable TV, Change 
Adds Up, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11, 2007, at A7 (noting the specific example of ESPN raising fees to 
cable companies, but also noting that “[t]he network says it has provided extra advertising time 
to cable operators as a way to make up for the extra expense and that it has little choice but to 
pay what sports leagues demand”). 
 104. See Time Warner, Disney Sign Long-Term Retransmission Deal, COMM. DAILY, May 
26, 2000, available at Factiva, Doc. comd000020010804dw5q001ja (“Settling their nasty, very 
public feud over retransmission consent rights, Time Warner and Disney signed a long-term 
deal Thurs. that will keep ABC on MSO’s cable systems for another 6 years. In what seemed to 
be capitulation of Time Warner to Disney’s demands, MSO also agreed to switch Disney 
Channel from pay to basic tier over [the] next 3 years, extend and expand carriage of 4 ESPN 
networks and carry 2 fledgling Disney cable networks, Toon Disney and SoapNet.”). 
 105. Lizzie McGuire (Disney Channel television series 2001–04). 
 106. Hannah Montana (Disney Channel television series 2006–11). One cannot question 
their economic utility, however: the television series Hannah Montana received a weekly 
audience in excess of 2.4 million viewers in a highly desirable economic category. See Peter 
Sanders, Disney Revs Up Tween Star Machine, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2008, at B1. 
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negotiations between content producers and cable companies, just as 
it does in other distribution channels. 
In sum, video producers and distributors both face the problem 
of very high fixed costs and very low marginal costs. Hollywood 
movies and high-value television programming are expensive to 
produce, but the audience can be expanded at essentially zero cost. 
Constructing a cable or fiber optic network is very expensive, but, 
once built, serving additional customers and providing additional 
content is a very low-cost proposition.107 In this environment, 
economic theory dictates that, if possible, the owners and distributors 
of content will each seek price-discrimination strategies.108 In video 
production, this has long resulted in windowing—the use of different 
distribution channels, each with a degree of exclusivity, to segment 
audiences based on their willingness to pay.109 And distributors use 
tiering and other premium offerings such as video on demand to 
effect similar strategies. 
B. Online Video Business Models 
I now turn to describe three different online video providers, 
each of which has a different manner in which its system is “closed,” 
to illustrate both the evolving business models and the interaction 
between these new models and traditional windowing and 
 
 107. See, e.g., Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the First Amendment: Theory and 
Praxis, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1990: REVISITING THE CABLE ACT 537, 568 n.128 (PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 386, 1990) 
(noting that, even in 1990, although start-up construction costs were substantial, fiber optic 
systems required lower maintenance costs, which in the long run minimized the economic 
impact of the original investment). 
 108. See David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
96, 62 (2010) (noting that content creators and providers in all fields of intellectual property are 
sometimes incentivized and able, through licensing practices, to engage in price discrimination); 
see also Vartan J. Saravia, Shades of Gray: The Internet Market of Copyrighted Goods and a Call 
for the Expansion of the First-Sale Doctrine, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 383, 397 (2009) (positing that in 
the realm of intellectual property there is a strong pull toward price-discrimination strategies 
because, given the necessary originality of individual works, none of the products are “perfect 
substitutes for each other, and because either by law or by contract, the copyright owners may 
prevent or limit the arbitrage opportunities for resellers”). 
 109. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To make price 
discrimination work, however, the seller must be able to control arbitrage. . . . A producer of 
movies segments the market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay-per-view services, 
next to the videotape and laserdisc market, and finally to cable and commercial tv.”). 
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distribution.110 These models also demonstrate how new video, no less 
than old video, depends on discrimination of different kinds. These 
tensions, which are inherent in a technological transition, in part 
create the competition problems that have come to the forefront 
through the Comcast-NBC merger. The three online video operations 
are Hulu, which is a joint venture of three leading broadcasters; 
ESPN3.com, the online arm of the single biggest sports video 
distributor; and TV Everywhere, an evolving joint venture of the 
cable companies to provide online video access to their own cable 
subscribers. Hulu is closed in the sense that much content is made 
available only by subscription. It is perhaps the least remarkable and 
least controversial offering, although there has been some 
controversy. ESPN3.com is closed in that subscription to the service is 
made via ISP, not directly to the consumer, and ESPN will not sell the 
service to individual consumers whose ISPs do not subscribe. Finally, 
TV Everywhere is closed because only customers of the cable 
companies that sponsor the service are permitted access, and access is 
tied to a subscription to traditional cable service. TV Everywhere is 
not available to other customers on a purchased basis. 
Hulu is perhaps the best known of these video services. Founded 
in 2007, Hulu is co-owned by three of the four major broadcast 
networks (NBCUniversal, News Corporation, and Disney), together 
with Hulu management and a private equity firm.111 Hulu licenses 
content from Fox, MGM, and many other content providers. Hulu is 
a leading aggregator of television programming, programming that 
previously was available directly from programmers’ websites or not 
available at all. At first, Hulu was an entirely advertising-supported 
site, with all content freely available, including both recently 
broadcast content and archives of prior television seasons and 
movies.112 This model did not, however, generate revenues similar to 
those generated by over-the-air viewing, and the content owners 
 
 110. For a more general discussion of the online video market, raised in the different 
context of copyright policy, see generally Marvin Ammori, Copyright’s Latest Communications 
Policy: Content-Lock-Out and Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 18 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 375 (2010). 
 111. See About, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 112. See Thanks, Me Hearties, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2008, at 74 (noting that, at the time, 
Hulu offered free, advertising-supported video streaming). 
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became “[w]orried that free Web versions of their biggest TV shows 
[were] eating into their traditional business.”113 
The owners’ traditional distribution partners contributed to this 
pressure. “[T]he networks were becoming increasingly insistent about 
seeking monthly fees from cable and satellite operators who used 
their broadcast signals. . . . [I]n tense negotiations, the cable and 
satellite operators had a big objection: Why would we pay you for 
content you make available free on the web?”114 In part as a result of 
those pressures, Hulu has begun a subscription service for most of its 
content—Hulu Plus. In order to access all but the most recent 
television shows, as well as some other, less desirable content, 
customers have to pay $7.99 a month.115 This has apparently enabled 
Hulu to license additional content, and it recently announced that 
Viacom content is returning.116 
The manner in which Hulu has closed its service is 
unremarkable, even on an Internet that generally values openness. 
Many content owners have tried to establish subscription-based 
businesses, although not nearly as many of them have actually 
succeeded. The Wall Street Journal is the only domestic newspaper 
that has proved able to keep most of its content available only by 
subscription, although the New York Times is beginning a second 
attempt at an online subscription service.117 Internet music sites 
floundered for some time after the first (illegal) incarnation of 
Napster,118 and iTunes, the first success story,119 is really more of a 
 
 113. Sam Schechner & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Hulu Reworks Its Script as Digital Change Hits 
TV, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A1. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Hulu Plus, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/plus (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 116. See Jason Kilar, Stewart, Colbert, and Hulu’s Thoughts About the Future of TV, HULU 
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), http://blog.hulu.com/2011/02/02/stewart-colbert-and-hulus-thoughts-about-
the-future-of-tv/. 
 117. See Arthur Sulzberger, A Letter to Our Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A26; 
Richard Pérez-Peña, Times to Stop Charging for Parts of Its Website, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, 
at C2. 
 118. See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, Music at Your Fingertips, but a Battle Among Those Selling It to 
You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at C21 (detailing the number of online music retailers that had 
sprung up in the aftermath of Napster, and pointing out that, in 2003, Apple’s director for 
marketing of applications and services claimed it was “hard to make money selling music 
downloads,” and that iTunes was only “close to break-even”). 
 119. As evidence of iTunes’s considerable success, consider its 2008 press release indicating 
that it had surpassed Wal-Mart as the leading music retailer in the United States. Press Release, 
Apple, supra note 90. 
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purchase-based application than a web service.120 In the online video 
space, Netflix’s online subscription service has boomed, to the point 
where some estimate that it represents 20 percent of the downstream 
traffic on the Internet during peak hours.121 But no one really objects 
when content owners attempt to capitalize on the value of their 
copyrights by requiring payment, whether based on subscription or 
one-time charges, for their content. 
ESPN3.com is perhaps less well known than Hulu, but it has a 
very devoted following. Sports programming in general is high-value 
programming122 and, although much of the content available on 
ESPN3.com is niche programming that does not have wide enough 
appeal to justify its being shown on traditional cable channels, the 
ESPN management claims that the viewership is intensely 
interested.123 Its business model is to license subscriptions to ISPs and 
then to provide access only to the customers of those ISPs.124 In other 
words, it is replicating the cable model: 
ESPN’s attempt to get ISPs to foot the bill is commonplace in the 
cable and satellite TV world, in which the likes of Comcast and 
DirecTV pay a per-subscriber fee to ESPN for its programming. On 
the Internet, it’s a different story. End-users are expected to foot the 
bill for such premium services, either via a subscription or pay-per-
view model.125 
Those ISPs that have subscribed echo a similar theme: Verizon, in 
particular, was an early adopter, with a spokesman saying, “It’s a 
 
 120. See, e.g., Tedeschi, supra note 118 (quoting Apple’s director for marketing of 
applications and services as stating that “one reason Apple was in the [online music] business 
was to drive sales of its iPod music player and to help the company position itself as a cutting-
edge brand”). 
 121. Sara Yin, Netflix Eats Up 20 Percent of U.S. Downstream Bandwidth, PCMAG.COM 
(Oct. 21, 2010, 5:45 PM EST), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2371260,00.asp. 
 122. See Diana Moss, Regional Sports Networks, Competition, and the Consumer, 21 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 56, 56–57 (2008) (“[Regional sports networks] are hugely profitable, with 
margins estimated at 30 to 40 percent and average fees of $2 per subscriber, second only to the 
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network’s (ESPN) fees of $2.50 per subscriber.”). 
 123. See Hiawatha Bray, ESPN Selling Premium Content to Net Providers, BOS. GLOBE, 
June 15, 2006, at D1 (noting that ESPN is “really talking about high-quality premium content 
that a lot of consumers have a demand for” (quoting Tanya Van Court, vice president and 
general manager of new media products at ESPN)). 
 124. Eliot Van Buskirk, ESPN to ISPs: Pay for Your Customers to Play Video, WIRED 
EPICENTER (Feb. 5, 2009, 5:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/02/espn-stands-fir. 
 125. Eric Bangeman, ESPN Charging ISPs to Carry ESPN360, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 1, 
2006, 1:08 PM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/08/7397.ars. 
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tremendous value-add—one more thing to help attract customers to 
our broadband service.”126 
ESPN’s model has drawn objections from the same groups that 
advocate for network neutrality. Ben Scott, the policy director for 
Free Press, has said, 
Ultimately, if you carry it to its logical extreme—that’s everyone 
charging for their content, and depending upon where you are and 
which ISP you’re using to connect to the internet, your internet 
experience is different—that’s a really unsettling prospect. . . . I 
think it undermines the foundational principles that make the 
internet such an engine of innovation and creativity.127 
Gigi Sohn, the President of Public Knowledge, called on the FCC to 
investigate the service on the ground that such “[e]xclusive deals, for 
example, could block providers of Internet video from offering 
certain types of content to their customers or prevent programmers 
from making their content available directly to viewers. This would 
prevent the emergence of Internet video services that could compete 
with MVPDs.”128 
The ESPN arrangement is an example of contractual vertical 
integration. At first blush, it seems to be driven by ESPN’s power as a 
content provider, exercising its copyright and licensing protections in 
order to raise revenues. It does not seem to be a case of 
discrimination by the ISPs, which is the typical concern of network 
neutrality. But it is, in fact, an example of traditional windowing 
taken into the Internet realm, in which channel exclusivity allows 
market segmentation. In the Internet era, it would be trivially easy for 
ESPN to offer the content of ESPN3.com to any customer who has a 
credit card. Why does it not? Because the fees that it generates from 
ISPs are in part based on the exclusivity generated—as the quotes 
from Verizon reveal—and that exclusivity has value to the extent that 
it encourages switching. A subscriber-pays alternative to payment by 
the ISP would not eliminate the advantage an ISP could claim, but it 
 
 126. Van Buskirk, supra note 124 (quoting Cliff Lee, Verizon spokesman); see also 
Bangeman, supra note 125 (“With Verizon rolling out its FiOS fiber network in selected areas, 
having premium content like ESPN360 may help convince some customers to switch.”). 
 127. Van Buskirk, supra note 124 (quoting Scott). 
 128. Gigi B. Sohn, President, Pub. Knowledge, Statement Before the Federal 
Communications Commission National Broadband Plan Workshop: Best Practices/Big Ideas 2 
(Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/gbsohn-ostatement-20090903
.pdf. 
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might invite the same criticism leveled at cable bundling: why is the 
ISP building into its price a charge for everyone, even though most do 
not care to watch out-of-market college football or Bundesliga 
soccer? 
TV Everywhere is the most recent of these three online-video 
business models, and its form of exclusivity is the most tightly tied to 
traditional media distributors. With TV Everywhere, subscribers to 
traditional MVPD services can access over the Internet much of the 
content that was available on their cable systems. Although Comcast 
and Time Warner began the service on their own in 2009,129 it has 
expanded to include Verizon.130 But, in all instances, non-MVPD 
subscribers cannot view the programming through the service.131 On 
the one hand, the cable companies claim that this is a consumer-
friendly development that is designed to respond to consumer 
demand to see the content, for which they are already paying, 
through multiple devices and in multiple locations—solutions 
consumers were beginning to implement on their own through digital 
video recorders and devices such as the Slingbox.132 On the other 
hand, a coalition of the same public interest groups that push for 
network neutrality rules has condemned the arrangement as likely to 
stifle online video services.133 
 
 129. Eliot Van Buskirk, Cable Departs from Hulu Model with “TV Everywhere,” CNN.COM 
(June 26, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-26/tech/wired.tv.everywhere_1_hulu-cable-
subscribers-television-programmers. 
 130. Yinka Adegoke, Time Warner Cable, Verizon to Test TV on the Web, REUTERS, Aug. 
27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/27/us-timewarnercable-idUSTRE57
Q0WY20090827. 
 131. See, e.g., Matthew Lasar, TV Everywhere: Gift to Consumers or Plot to Kill Online TV?, 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2010/01/tv-
everywhere-causing-controversy-everywhere.ars. 
 132. See Jessica L. Talar, Note, My Place or Yours: Copyright, Place-Shifting, & the 
Slingbox: A Legislative Proposal, 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 25, 27–29 (2007) 
(describing the operation of the Slingbox). 
 133. E.g., Press Release, Pub. Knowledge, Public Knowledge Criticizes ‘TV Everywhere’ 
(June 24, 2009), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2493 (“Limiting access to 
programming is straight out of the cable playbook, going back to the days when Congress had to 
act in 1992 to allow the satellite programming distributors to have access to cable programming. 
This new version raises substantial anti-competitive issues by restricting the availability of 
programming to the favored distribution methods.”); Josh Silver, Comcast Launches “TV 
Everywhere”: Say Goodbye to Free Online Television, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2010, 6:13 
PM),   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/comcast-launches-tv-every_b_411057.html 
(“TV Everywhere is designed to protect the current cable TV subscription model and block 
competition from upstart online video ventures like Vuze, Roku and Hulu.”). 
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TV Everywhere “has been slow to materialize,” both in terms of 
significant use by cable customers and in terms of the amount of 
content available through the service.134 What is not known is the 
degree to which content licensed to TV Everywhere is licensed on an 
exclusive basis, such that content providers would agree to not make 
it available through other streaming or video-on-demand services. If 
the licenses were nonexclusive, this would lend credence to the cable 
companies’ descriptions. But if the licenses are exclusive, then the 
availability of the online content is another incentive to drive 
consumers to traditional cable subscriptions. For Comcast, the merger 
conditions provide limits here,135 but those, of course, apply only to 
NBC-Comcast. 
To be sure, these three offerings do not exhaust the universe of 
online video business models, but most of the other implementations 
are not “closed” in any relevant sense or in any sense different from 
Hulu’s requiring a subscription. YouTube is a multibillion dollar 
online video business and, although its content is largely amateur, it 
has increasingly moved to hosting channels of professional 
productions, such as music videos and even some authorized clips of 
broadcast television. Even amateur online video is relevant in the 
market, however, for it draws eyeballs from professional video. A 
bevy of other start-ups is attempting to aggregate enough content and 
distribution to make a play in this market. 
C. Video Is Not the End 
Specialized video offerings are not the last word in managed 
services that Internet-access providers could offer to their customers, 
even if they are the most naturally related to providers’ current 
businesses. Most of the broadband distribution companies, whether 
they are incumbent cable, cable overbuilders, or new fiber entrants, 
offer voice services over their platforms.136 These services are usually 
provided on a managed basis, even though they could be provided 
solely as applications running on the Internet-access portion of the 
platform, as they are when offered by non-facilities-based VoIP 
 
 134. Brian Stelter, Two Hints at Stepped-Up Media Rivalry in Online Streaming, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2011, at B3. 
 135. See supra notes 58–76 and accompanying text. 
 136. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Questions on the Future of Landlines and the Risks to Phone 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at B6 (noting that cable companies are swallowing up an 
increasing share of the telecommunications market by offering broadband and voice services). 
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companies. The reason for this is quality of service: the provider can 
manage the bandwidth dedicated to voice service, both in the local 
access network and through backbone capacity, to ensure that the call 
quality is high and not degraded by other traffic. Two-way voice 
telephony is subject to jitter and latency concerns to an extent that 
even streaming video, which can be buffered, is not.137 The Comcast-
NBC Consent Decree excludes VoIP from its definition of specialized 
services, probably because the FCC has already clearly defined 
nondiscrimination obligations for VoIP access. If the FCC has legal 
authority to regulate any service provided outside of traditional 
telephony and cable services, it has legal authority to regulate VoIP 
that interconnects with the traditional telephone network.138 VoIP 
could be extended to offer managed video-conference solutions in the 
future, a service currently offered by others on Internet platforms.139 
Beyond pure communications or media services, one can imagine 
platform providers offering a variety of other managed services to 
their customers. The platform provider would assert, at least, that 
these managed services would benefit from a guaranteed quality of 
service and therefore could not be as easily offered over the Internet-
access portion of the platform. The Comcast-NBC materials suggest 
one such service: medical monitoring and associated health services.140 
Under some discussed implementations, the service would entail not 
just the housing of medical records in personalized, cloud-based 
accounts, but also a variety of real-time services, ranging from 
emergency-call service to the collection of medical data from testing 
devices or even from body monitors.141 
 
 137. E.g., Princy Mehta & Sanjay Udani, Voice Over IP, IEEE POTENTIALS, Oct.–Nov. 
2001, at 36, 36. 
 138. This is because such a service would be interconnected with a Title II 
telecommunications service and therefore “ancillary” to it. See Speta, supra note 8, at 121 
(discussing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction). 
 139. One such example is Skype, which supports group video calling. See Business, SKYPE, 
http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/business (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 140. See Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc. for 
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 249, 
299 (2011) (memorandum opinion and order)  (noting the “health and cultural” educational 
information that can be provided as a result of the merger). 
 141. E.g., NEAL NEUBERGER, INTERNET INNOVATION ALLIANCE, ADVANCING 
HEALTHCARE THROUGH BROADBAND: OPENING UP A WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES 4 (2007), 
available at http://internetinnovation.org/files/special-reports/Advancing_Healthcare_Through_
Broadband_-_Neuberger.pdf; Philip J. Weiser, Dale Hatfield & Brad Bernthal, The Future of 9-
1-1: New Technologies and the Need for Reform, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 213, 243 
(2008). 
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Alternatively, many of the envisioned implementations of smart-
grid technologies, or intense demand-side power management, have a 
strong communications component.142 Electric companies are resisting 
some of these implementations on the ground that they might provide 
an insecure entryway into the electricity network.143 Broadband 
providers might, therefore, offer energy monitoring and feedback 
systems on a managed basis to provide an enhanced level of security 
as well as guaranteed up-time. Such offerings might well be exclusive 
between the broadband carriers and the power companies. 
A third example of managed service offerings based on quality-
of-service claims would be telecommuting options. Companies are 
paying more attention to the security of remote connections. And the 
bandwidth demands of telecommuters—who not only need access to 
bandwidth-intensive corporate applications but also are increasingly 
using video conferencing and online meetings while telecommuting—
continue to grow. Combined with a move to cloud-based enterprise 
services, which themselves often involve a managed network 
component, the broadband providers could offer a quality-of-service 
claim for these services.144 
To be sure, all of these services could be offered over a generic 
Internet connection, and many companies have already begun to 
develop them for such delivery.145 Nevertheless, broadband providers 
might claim to be uniquely positioned to offer some aspects of these 
 
 142. E.g., V.K. SOOD, D. FISCHER, J.M. EKLUND & T. BROWN, DEVELOPING A 
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE SMART GRID 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.wireie.com/pdfs/Developing_a_Communication_Infrastructure_for_the_Smart_Grid
.pdf. 
 143. E.g., Clark W. Gellings, Marek Samotyj & Bill Howe, The Future’s Smart Delivery 
System, IEEE POWER & ENERGY MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 40, 43 (“Maintaining the security of 
electric power supplies to these systems will become increasingly important in years to come. 
An EPRI survey of electric utilities revealed real concerns about grid and communications 
security.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Deborah Gage, VCs: The Time to Make Money in Security Has Finally 
Arrived, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/02/14/vcs-the-time-
to-make-money-in-security-has-finally-arrived (detailing the venture capital opportunities that 
exist in computer security as a result of uncertainties in cloud computing); see also Joanne 
Taaffe, Changing Face, TOTAL TELECOM, Feb. 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2115149 
(noting Microsoft’s ever-increasing list of telecommunications offerings, including cloud-based 
services, which appear to be a direct response to competitive pressures within the industry 
resulting from the possibilities of cloud platforms). 
 145. See, e.g., IP ALARMS, http://www.internet-alarm.net/home.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2011). 
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services—especially security and reliability. A recent white paper by 
CISCO argues that 
[s]ervice providers must employ a strategy that enables them to 
move up the managed services stack, thereby benefiting from higher 
margins and driving primary demand for lower-level services. . . . 
To differentiate delivery, the computing structure must move into 
the network to provide [service providers] with end-to-end control, 
resulting in the ability to guarantee service-level agreements and 
provide extensive and sophisticated levels of monitoring and 
support.146 
Even in the days of traditional telephony, network providers sought 
to provide enterprise services that included not only “dumb pipe” 
services but also a variety of customized communications, network, 
and service packages.147 That incentive will certainly be duplicated, 
and these are only a few of the interesting value-added services that 
broadband to the home may make possible. 
The point is not to criticize these offerings. Indeed, it might in 
fact be beneficial to provide enhanced security and reliability for 
some of them, and it might be that those extra aspects of service are 
more easily provided over a segmented portion of the platform rather 
than as part of the generic Internet-access stream. But if the Internet 
portion of the platform is subject to network neutrality rules or 
similar norms, then the incentive difficulties simply reappear. The 
broadband provider would not provide enhanced service to its entire 
Internet-access customer base, and network neutrality would allow 
the provider—or require it—to refuse to offer enhanced service to 
those companies willing to pay for it. 
III.  THE INEVITABILITY OF ANTITRUST META-SUPERVISION 
The foregoing two stories reach the point of overlapping: The 
first Part shows the interaction effect between network neutrality 
regulation and the traditional services offered by cable and other 
 
 146. BRYAN MOBLEY, STUART TAYLOR & ANDREW YOUNG, CISCO INTERNET BUS. 
SOLUTIONS GRP., NEXT GENERATION MANAGED SERVICES: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS 6–7 (2009), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/
pov/VMS_POV_0717FINAL.pdf. 
 147. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 28-11 (1992) (noting 
that “an important issue for AT&T during 1992 will be its ability to continue offering 
customized service packages”). 
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multichannel companies. Traditional business models can give rise to 
incentives to take actions that can negate the effect of any network 
neutrality regulation. Worse, network neutrality rules can also give 
rise to incentives to limit innovation on the broadband platform by 
deploying new services as managed services instead. The second Part 
shows, against the background of the customary use of windowing 
and tiering, that these business models are also finding their way into 
online video-distribution businesses. These narratives converge on 
two lessons. First, nondiscrimination rules cannot be selectively 
applied to converged carriers’ Internet services without a significant 
loss of effectiveness of those rules or, alternatively, without significant 
attention paid to the interaction effect by limiting carriers’ options to 
provide other kinds of services. Second, a noneconomic discussion of 
network neutrality rules—that is, one that is driven principally by 
something other than foreclosure concerns—is an impoverished 
approach. Given the technological and business reality that a carrier 
can shift content or services from an Internet-delivered 
implementation to a managed service outside of the Internet 
platform, the costs and benefits of nondiscrimination can only be 
evaluated within a construct that takes account of this 
multidimensional foreclosure. In sum, one may be able to make a 
wholly noneconomic case for network neutrality rules, but those rules 
will be ineffective and can only be rescued by an antitrust-like 
competition analysis. 
First, nondiscrimination rules cannot be applied to the Internet 
portion of a broadband platform alone without a serious loss of 
general effectiveness. The domain of network neutrality rules, 
however, is in fact usually limited to the Internet-access portion of a 
platform. Moreover, limiting such rules to the Internet services 
domain may well be compelled by the Communications Act as 
currently stated. If the managed service were a “cable service,” then 
nondiscrimination treatment would be precluded by the Act’s 
prohibition on regulating cable services as common carriage.148 If the 
managed service were not a “cable service,” then the FCC might 
characterize it as an “information service.”149 But the FCC would 
 
 148. For a discussion of the prohibition on regulating cable services as common carriage, see 
supra notes 16–23 and accompanying text. 
 149. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006) (“The term ‘information service’ means the offering of a 
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or 
making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but 
SPETA IN PRINTER PROOF (REVISED).DOC 4/21/2011  5:29:28 PM 
2011] SUPERVISING MANAGED SERVICES 1751 
almost certainly not have regulatory authority over that “information 
service.” In Comcast Corp. v. FCC,150 the D.C. Circuit emphatically 
stated that the FCC does not have general regulatory authority over 
information services: it can only regulate if the information service is 
ancillary to a “statutorily mandated responsibility.”151 And the FCC 
has no statutorily mandated responsibility that could be stretched to 
apply nondiscrimination rules to managed services. Thus, the FCC 
has no regulatory tool that would forbid the carrier from developing 
business responses to a nondiscrimination rule on its Internet 
platform by moving content or services to a managed platform or 
offering.152 
In fact, it bears noting that the managed service need not be 
provided on a separate platform. So long as the FCC does not forbid 
vertical integration, the carrier can combine with a content or services 
company and offer it on the Internet platform, but offer it in a 
selective manner similar to ESPN3.com. ESPN3.com does not make 
its content available to every consumer on the Internet who is willing 
to pay; it is a cable channel on an Ethernet connection. If the 
restriction is imposed by the content or application provider, then it 
does not offend a network neutrality rule on the carrier. 
Moreover, these possibilities for evasion are not the only danger 
of a nondiscrimination rule restricted to the Internet-access service of 
converged platforms. The rule could be counterproductive to the 
broader goals of network neutrality. If substantial numbers of services 
are pulled from the Internet platform into managed services offerings, 
their visibility outside of the carrier’s closed ecosystem would 
diminish. The Internet’s role as the general locus of innovation could 
be diminished, as carriers and other parties focus not on Internet 
 
does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a 
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.”). Even this 
characterization would be doubtful, as the service might well not be offered “via 
telecommunications,” because telecommunications are “the transmission, between or among 
points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or 
content of the information as sent and received.” Id. § 153(43). Depending on the service, there 
might not be any specification by the user of “points” for the transmission. 
 150. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 151. See id. at 661 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 152. The FCC did, in its December 2010 Open Internet Order, attempt to re-establish its 
jurisdiction over Internet services. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52 
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 36–44 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order). Even that order does not 
offer a more general theory that would cover managed services. 
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services but on managed services. This would be a shift of the 
innovation locus which, in my view, could be either good or bad. But 
the shift does run counter to the general policy articulated by many 
network neutrality advocates: maximizing the possibility of 
innovation done independently of the carriers.153 The objection that 
“managed Internet” services offend the open innovation ethic of the 
Internet has already been made by the network neutrality advocates 
who object to ESPN3.com.154 
To be sure, one statutory response that would overcome the 
evasion of a network neutrality rule would be to require cable 
companies and other converged platform providers to offer all 
services on a common-carrier basis or to forbid any vertical 
integration. Radical structural separation of content and carriage has 
been proposed before, in a variety of contexts, to respond to a variety 
of competition or discrimination problems. The 1956 AT&T Consent 
Decree forbade the Bell System from being in the content business, a 
result thought important because AT&T was also the principal means 
by which television content moved around the country.155 The 1982 
AT&T Consent Decree also initially prohibited the Bell Operating 
Companies from providing electronic publishing.156 United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc.157 required the movie companies to divest 
their ownership in their principal distribution channel—the first-run 
movie theaters.158 And similar calls for requiring cable companies to 
be common carriers echo from at least the mid-1980s.159 
Communications policy, however, has almost always rejected 
such radical separation, as evidenced in numerous sections of the 
Communications Act. Instead, the Act has generally treated vertical 
integration as acceptable, within limits, or at least as tolerable. As 
already noted, the Act forbids regulating broadcast licensees and 
 
 153. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1012–20 (2005). 
 154. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 155. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246, at 71,138 (D.N.J.). 
 156. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 185 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 157. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
 158. Id. at 172 (“It is the relationship of the unreasonable restraints of trade to the position 
of the defendants in the exhibition field (and more particularly in the first-run phase of that 
business) that is of first importance on the divestiture phase of these cases.”). 
 159. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 172 (1983) (predicting 
that, once a majority of programming has shifted from broadcast to pay channels, cable “cannot 
in a free society be other than a carrier”). 
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cable companies as common carriers.160 The FCC’s Computer II161 and 
Computer III162 rules allowed common carriers to offer information 
services, although there were at times requirements that such services 
be offered through separate subsidiaries or that common carriers 
develop access arrangements that other information services 
providers could purchase to duplicate the carriers’ own offerings.163 
Broadcast licensing has been successively liberalized to allow the 
networks to own licenses covering greater portions of the country.164 
And, in cable particularly, vertical integration has long been 
permitted. Cable companies are allowed to program almost all of 
their channels, and they are also allowed to own many of the channels 
that they choose to program.165 
The reason is that communications policy has long recognized 
the (at least potential) benefits of vertical integration between 
content and carriage. In broadcasting, vertical integration created 
substantial efficiencies in the markets for programming, advertising, 
and distribution. In information services, the carriers were thought to 
bring a unique capability to provide innovative services. 
Cable, in particular, shows a back-and-forth in which the benefits 
of vertical integration are recognized but balanced with the possibility 
that vertical integration or similar contractual exclusivity can create 
foreclosure—in this case the exclusion of distribution competitors by 
denying them access to valuable content or the exclusion of content 
competitors by denying them access to valuable distribution channels. 
The 1992 Cable Act166 required the FCC to set horizontal and vertical 
 
 160. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 161. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry) (Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision). 
 162. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry) (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order). 
 163. For an analysis of the FCC’s Computer II rule, see Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the 
Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 181–99 
(2003). For a discussion of the Computer III rule, see id. at 199–203. 
 164. See generally Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the First Amendment, and 
Democracy’s Future, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1555–61 (2008) (charting the FCC’s history of 
regulating media ownership). 
 165. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing 
the FCC’s imposition of “horizontal and vertical limits” on cable companies). 
 166. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385, 
106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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ownership limits for cable operators.167 In setting the vertical limit, the 
FCC reviewed the benefits of allowing some integration: 
First, [cable multiple system operator] MSO investment has 
produced a wealth of high quality cable programming services. 
Many of the most popular cable programming services were 
initiated or sustained with the help of MSO investment. Second, 
vertical integration between cable operators and video programming 
services appears to produce efficiencies in the distribution, 
marketing, and purchase of programming. Third, vertical integration 
can reduce programming costs, which in turn may reduce subscriber 
fees and cable rates. Fourth, vertical integration may in certain 
circumstances foster investment in more innovative and riskier 
programming services.168 
The Act also limited exclusivity agreements, however, through the 
program access rules, which required cable companies to provide 
certain programs to competing multichannel platforms.169 Here, the 
concern for foreclosure of competing platforms was paramount. As 
the FCC explained, 
As a general matter, the public interest in exclusivity in the sale of 
entertainment programming is widely recognized. Indeed, elsewhere 
in the 1992 Cable Act, in the context of broadcast station-cable 
system relationship, specific steps have been taken to protect 
exclusive rights. In the unique situation presented here, however, it 
is clear that exclusivity is not favored. Congress has clearly placed a 
higher value on new competitive entry than on the continuation of 
exclusive distribution practices . . . .170 
This same balancing act is present even in the NBC-Comcast 
Consent Decree, notwithstanding its sometimes clear requirements 
that the company license on terms prevailing in the market. The DOJ 
acknowledged that “[t]he video programming distribution industry 
frequently uses exclusive contract terms that can be 
 
 167. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006). 
 168. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992: Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, 8 FCC Rcd. 8565, 
8594–95 (1993) (second report and order). 
 169. 47 U.S.C. § 548. 
 170. Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video 
Programming Distribution and Carriage, 8 FCC Rcd. 3359, 3384 (1993) (first report and order). 
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procompetitive.”171 For example, it can “maximize the revenues [that] 
it earns” and also “encourage[] the various distributors, such as cable 
companies, to promote the content during a distribution window by 
assuring the distributor that the content will not be available through 
other distribution channels at a lower price.”172 
As operationalized, the Decree does have some prophylactic 
rules, but the general principle seems to be one of balance: “The 
proposed Final Judgment strikes a balance by allowing reasonable 
and customary exclusivity provisions that enhance competition while 
prohibiting those provisions that, without any offsetting 
procompetitive benefits, hinder the development of effective 
competition from OVDs.”173 Comcast is forbidden to enter into 
contracts that condition its purchase of video programming on the 
programmer’s not licensing the content to online video providers, but 
Comcast may secure exclusive agreements for a fourteen-day window 
(or an agreement for a thirty-day window forbidding free online 
distribution) or such exclusive agreements as are secured by other 
MVPDs.174 This last condition does allow exclusivity to develop in the 
marketplace, while seeking to cabin any market power that Comcast 
may have. 
In short, if one rules out prohibitions on vertical integration, as 
the Act generally has, then a nondiscrimination rule addressed to 
only a portion of a platform is seriously problematic. 
This leads back to the nature of nondiscrimination rules. 
Nondiscrimination has never been a significant part of the video 
production market and has only played a minor role in the video 
distribution market. This is because producers and distributors both 
face an economic problem—the low marginal cost of their product—
and the possibility of segmenting customers and producers maximizes 
revenues for both producers and distributors. The application of a 
nondiscrimination rule to a new distribution technology—the 
Internet-access portion of a platform—creates a revenue problem for 
the distributor, and consequently for the producer as well, which 
explains why both the cable companies and the copyright holders are 
nervous about Hulu-type business models and are looking for 
 
 171. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63, at 35. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 36. 
 174. Id. at 37. 
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alternatives.175 The potential loss of revenues when traditional 
business models are threatened by change creates pressure either to 
replicate those models in the new distribution space or to restrict the 
new distribution space’s potential to compete with the traditional 
models. If regulation imposes a nondiscrimination rule for the new 
distribution space, then the rule must be supplemented in two ways. 
First, it must be supplemented by a mandate that the carrier not 
restrict the size or scope of the new space in a way that limits the 
damage to the traditional space (as a cable company might restrict 
Internet bandwidth in order to protect traditional video business 
models). And second, the nondiscrimination rule must be 
supplemented by rules that forbid the carrier from offering new 
services in a managed service format, in which it can apply traditional 
business models. 
Both of these conditions are present in Comcast-NBC. On the 
first point, the DOJ and the FCC have required Comcast to maintain 
significant Internet-access speeds to ensure that Comcast does not act 
to restrict the Internet space as a competitor to video.176 Neither the 
DOJ nor the FCC, however, seems to have wanted to try to write a 
condition requiring the online side to grow. And on the second point, 
the DOJ and the FCC have limited Comcast’s ability to offer 
managed video services—the area of specialized services that most 
concerned the regulators.177 
This in turn raises the second, more general question: what 
arguments are adequate to support a nondiscrimination rule, either 
general or highly specific in its implementation? The answer is that a 
solely noneconomic case for nondiscrimination rules cannot capture 
the entire problem. Attempting to describe a nondiscrimination 
problem and solution without evaluating the regulation’s economic 
effects will leave the problem underdescribed and the regulation 
 
 175. See, e.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski & Meg James, Hulu’s Tug of War with TV, L.A. TIMES, 
May 11, 2009, at B1 (noting that media executives were “terrified” by Hulu and were 
considering alternatives such as “authentication,” whereby Internet users would be required to 
show proof of a paid TV subscription as a condition of watching current programs on Hulu); 
Dawn C. Chmielewski & David Sarno, More TV Viewers May Be Cutting the Cord This Year, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/03/business/la-fi-electronics-show-
20110104 (describing the “fresh headaches” that Internet video has provided entertainment-
industry executives, primarily industry fears that online video content would disrupt traditional 
cable TV viewing patterns and diminish advertising revenue). 
 176. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
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ineffective. It is true that network neutrality regulation does have 
proponents who argue that the rule is necessary to prevent 
foreclosure strategies.178 But coming to dominate the debate are a 
series of noneconomic arguments or what might be called 
macroeconomic arguments. The noneconomic arguments contend 
that network neutrality regulation is necessary to provide an 
adequate space for new free speech activities.179 The macroeconomic 
arguments focus on economic spillovers into other areas that are 
possible if one regulates the Internet platform to essentially create a 
new public utility, which I think is simply a more general argument 
that Internet openness promotes innovation in applications and 
content services.180 These arguments may be sufficient—although I 
think generally not—for imposing a network neutrality rule on 
Internet services. But given the interaction effects already described, 
which can mute, eliminate, or reverse the effectiveness of the rule, 
they cannot end the analysis. 
This is the sense in which I believe that an antitrust analysis of 
the space is inevitable, both generally and specifically. Only antitrust 
provides the analytic tools necessary to determine whether 
discrimination strategies are likely to be harmful in any individual 
case, combined with an economic analysis that can identify incentives 
and opportunities for companies to engage in compensating behaviors 
 
 178. In addition to Lemley and Lessig, supra note 6, the most prominent example is Barbara 
van Schewick. See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND 
INNOVATION (2010) (arguing that network providers are altering the internal structure of the 
Internet in a manner that stifles innovation). 
 179. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) 
(“By changing the social conditions of speech, digital technologies lead to new social conflicts 
over the ownership and control of information capital. . . . But the same technologies also 
produce new methods of control that can limit democratic cultural participation. Therefore, free 
speech values—interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform 
culture—must be protected through technological design and through administrative and 
legislative regulation of technology . . . .”); Marvin Ammori, Network Neutrality and the 21st 
Century First Amendment, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 10, 2009, 10:54 AM), http://balkin.blogspot
.com/2009/12/net-neutrality-and-21st-century-first.html (“Phone and cable companies 
want . . . to block user requests, charge software companies and websites discriminatory prices 
to reach users, and even cut exclusive deals . . . . A network neutrality rule, quite simply, would 
forbid the phone and cable [sic] from interfering with the Internet in these ways.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 153, at 997–98 (“These cumulative processes also 
involve nonlinear progression, feedback loops, spillovers, and numerous other complications 
that frustrate modelers and defy simplification. All of these characteristics contribute to 
information and transaction cost problems that make relying on property-based, market-driven 
management of basic research results almost outrageous . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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such as a move to managed services. Video economics thrives when 
both producers and distributors engage in certain kinds of 
discrimination. The adoption of nondiscrimination rules without 
regard to interaction effects outside their stated domain can drive 
services from the regulated domain to other types of offerings. A 
nondiscrimination rule, unless it forbids many beneficial or at least 
benign business strategies, cannot alone address this concern. 
Antitrust asks the questions necessary to determine whether 
discrimination is a likely indicator of foreclosure—whether the parties 
have market power and how the relevant markets operate. Antitrust 
also attends to possible efficiencies of vertical arrangements, 
including arrangements that involve discrimination. 
By antitrust, I mean antitrust-type reasoning that addresses 
whether discrimination is likely to evidence foreclosure and that is 
flexible enough to identify overlapping markets in the manner in 
which Internet access and managed services necessarily overlap. Such 
reasoning need not be tied to traditional antitrust institutions, such as 
the Federal Trade Commission or the DOJ Antitrust Division. Those 
entities face a doctrinal problem that pure access regulation is 
probably not an available antitrust liability theory or remedy, at least 
under the current doctrine.181 Foreclosure actions remain available, 
but these actions raise an institutional question that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. If one selects the traditional institutions of 
antitrust, then one probably loses the ability to act based on 
predictive judgments about competitive effects. The future of the 
FCC—to recall this Symposium’s title—is to make exactly these sorts 
of predictive judgments, supported by evidence, in the markets in 
which it is expert. 
CONCLUSION 
The Comcast-NBC transaction highlights a reality of 
multipurpose, converged platforms that has been all too absent from 
the network neutrality debate in recent years. In particular, it 
highlights the possibility that such a platform provider would have 
 
 181. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 
(2004) (concluding that there was no antitrust action for denial of access required by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996); James B. Speta, Modeling an Antitrust Regulator for 
Telecoms, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 101, 106 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2009) (concluding that 
Trinko forbids antitrust actions to ensure access). 
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both the ability and the incentive to evade a nondiscrimination rule 
addressed to the Internet portion of the platform. Discrimination 
strategies designed to enhance revenues have long been important in 
both content and distribution markets, as demonstrated by 
widespread and widely accepted windowing, tiering, and bundling 
strategies. If nondiscrimination regulation forbids those sorts of 
strategies, then carriers will have the incentive to restrict the Internet-
access channel or to shift content and services to managed portions of 
the platform, in which case the effectiveness of nondiscrimination 
rules would be severely compromised. 
This specific example also teaches a broader lesson about the 
limits of noneconomic reasoning in a largely commercial domain. A 
noneconomic argument may be adequate to support government 
intervention, but such an argument alone is insufficient to account for 
the feedback effects that managed services make available. In order 
to account for the ecosystem, one needs the tools of competition 
analysis. 
